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  Abstract—Providing Privacy and security for aggregated data 
in wireless sensor networks has drawn the attention of practicing 
engineers and researchers globally. Several cryptographic 
methods have been already proposed to solve security and data 
integrity problems for aggregated data. Matrix cryptography is a 
better option for creating secure encryption/decryption 
algorithms to counter quantum attack. However, these algorithms 
have higher computational cost and increased communication 
overhead. Hence, a new technique of loss-less secure data 
aggregation in Clustered Wireless Sensor Networks is presented. 
The proposed method uses integer matrices as keys for data 
security and data integrity. Matrix operations are carried out in 
finite field Zp. Loss-less secure data aggregation is extended for 
homomorphic summation while the cipher text expansion ratio is 
kept substantially low. The proposed algorithm has inbuilt fast 
and efficient signature verification facility. The execution time of 
our signature verification mechanism is found to be 
approximately 50 percent less compared to a couple of standard 
existing signature verification schemes.  
 
Keywords—loss-less data aggregation, integer matrices as 
keys, finite field Zp, homomorphic aggregation 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE main task of Data Aggregation (DA) in WSN is to 
combine the collected data from the sensor nodes into a 
meaningful aggregate [1-2]. The aggregate may be sum, 
average, count, min, max, median or any other aggregating 
function of the individual data. The aggregate type depends on 
the requirement of the users. In general, during the aggregation 
process, DA eliminates trivial, duplicate and redundant data 
values. DA effectively reduces the data size from the 
aggregator to the final End User (EU) through intermediate 
Relay Nodes (NSs), Base Station (BS), and Cloud Server (CS). 
The reduction in the data size in turn decreases the traffic load 
and consequently the computational time and energy 
consumption are also reduced. This increases the life of the 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). 
A. Secure Data Aggregation 
With DA, the aggregated data is located at the aggregator and 
at the intermediate relay nodes. If these locations are attacked, 
the entire data will be compromised. The exposure of 
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aggregated data is more detrimental than the leakage of 
individual data. Thus, the data security is very critical when 
DA is implemented compared to the non-aggregated data 
transmission. Secure Data Aggregation (SDA) provides both 
aggregation and security for the aggregate. The main security 
features are as follows. Data confidentiality (privacy): In 
WSN, data confidentiality ensures the secrecy of the sensed 
data. It should not be disclosed to unauthorized agents. Data 
confidentiality is an important ingredient in defense related 
(military) and medical applications. Data confidentiality is 
provided using suitable cryptographic schemes. Data integrity: 
Data integrity provides protection against data alteration due to 
noise, communication channel errors or active attacks, etc. 
Normally, Message Authentication Codes (MAC) and error 
detection codes are employed to provide data integrity. Data 
authenticity: Data authenticity ensures the data source is 
genuine and not fake. Compromised source nodes with fake 
identities are detected with appropriate digital signature 
scheme.  
B. Lossy and Loss less Secure Data Aggregation 
SDA can be lossy or loss-less. In lossy SDA, some of the 
information, which is insignificant for the concerned 
application, is lost. But the contextually essential data is 
retained. On the other hand, in loss-less SDA, the full data is 
retained. The final decoder can recover the full data from the 
encrypted and aggregated data.   
II. RELATED WORK 
Several review articles [2-15] are available on SDA in WSN. 
In these papers, the authors have comprehensively described 
various methods for SDA for different topological 
configurations. Different types of security requirements and 
various cryptographic techniques to meet the above 
requirements suitable for SDA are discussed in these survey 
papers. Homomorphic encryption/decryption schemes for SDA 
are discussed by a few authors [16-19]. In [16], the authors 
Domingo-Ferrer [19] have used privacy homo-morphism 
method for SDA. Here the sensor data is split into several 
components at encryption and then recovered by combining 
them after decryption. This process increases the overall 
computational cost. In [17], Niu et al., have described lossy 
data aggregation with integrity scheme using bilinear maps. 
The disadvantage of this scheme is loss of data during 
aggregation and heavy computational overhead due to the use 
of bilinear maps. In [18], homomorphic Paillier encryption for 
protecting data privacy and homomorphic MAC to provide 
data integrity are adopted. This scheme involves the 
calculation of modular exponentiations and modular inverses 
which result in excessive computational overhead when the 
data from large number of nodes are to be aggregated. In [20-
21], the authors use the principle of CDMA to aggregate the 
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data. Here Message Authentication Codes are used for 
verifying data integrity. This increases the computational cost 
when the size of the data set is large. In [22-23], lattice 
(matrix) based cryptographic methods are used for secure data 
aggregation. Here low valued noise and scrambling matrices 
are used to randomize the encryption. Selection of these 
matrices is critical in the design of encryption/decryption 
process. The lengths of the public keys are relatively large. In 
[22-23] signature insertion/verification is substantially 
complex. In [30] and [31], matrix methods are used to provide 
digital signature. But when adopted for secure data 
aggregation, the length of the signature increases linearly with 
the number of data elements to be aggregated.  To overcome 
the above disadvantages, we propose a new method of SDA 
that uses integer matrices as keys with easy signature insertion 
and verification facility.    
III. PROPOSED WORK 
Our proposed method provides Loss-Less SDA using Matrices 
as Keys. The method is designated as SDA-MK. Here the 
individual data from the sensors are combined and encrypted 
to get the secure aggregated data which is decrypted by the 
final receiver. SDA-MK uses integer matrices in the finite field 
(Galois field) Zp. In Zp, all the elements are in the range 0 to 
p−1 and all the algebraic/arithmetic operations are carried out 
with respect to modulo p which is relatively a large prime 
number.    
A. Symbols, Notations and definitions 
The basic layout of the WSN is shown in Fig.1. It has a single 
Cluster Head (CH) which collects the data from the sensors 
and then aggregates the data and forwards the aggregated data 
to the Cloud Server (CS) via intermediate Relay Nodes (RNs) 
and Base Station (BS). The End User (EU) gets the aggregate 
from CS. Here the CH acts as the loss-less Aggregator. EU 
acts as de-aggregator. The number of sensors nodes attached to 
the CH is taken as N. 
 
 
Fig.1 Basic Layout of SDA 
 
B. Sensor Data Row Vector 
Let the Individual sensor data received by the CH be denoted 
by d1, d2… dN in appropriate units. Then the sensor data is 
represented by the Sensor Data Row Vector D as, 
 
     D = [d1, d2,…, dN]                           (1) 
 
The size of D is 1xN. Individual sensor data values d1, d2… dN 
are assumed to be integers in the range 0 to p−1. Here p is the 
modulus of the finite field Zp.  {If the original data from a node 
is a fractional number, it is converted into the corresponding 
integer by scaling up by 10, 100, or say 1000.Thus 2.34 → 
2.34*100 = 234. At the receiving side it is scaled down by 
100}. The modulus p is a prime number greater than the 
estimated maximum element of the data vector D. The 
elements of D belong to Zp.  
C. Secrete Key Matrix C 
Matrix C is the secret key of the SDA system. The elements of 
C belong to the finite field Zp. The size of C is M x (N+1) with 
M > N+1.Thus C∈ 𝑍𝑝
𝑀×(𝑁+1)
. The rank of C should be N+1. 
The reason for choosing a rectangular matrix for C of rank 
N+1, instead of a square matrix, is explained in section III E.   
D. Base Matrix B 
Base Matrix B is the Modular Matrix Inverse [24] of C.  The 




    B = mmi(C, p)                                                                    (2) 
Here, function mmi() stands for the modular matrix inversion 
with respect to the modulus p.  From the definition of mmi(),  
   mmi(C, p)*C = I(N+1)x(N+1)                                                  (3) 
Since C is a tall matrix (No. of rows > No. of columns) of rank 
N+1, it has the left inverse [25] as,    
 𝑪𝒍𝒆𝒇𝒕
−𝟏 = (𝑪𝑻 ∗ 𝑪)−1 ∗ 𝑪𝑻                        (4) 
Here, CT is the transpose of C. The size of the product 
(𝑪𝑻 ∗ 𝑪) is {(N+1) xM} x {M x (N+1)} = (N+1) x (N+1) its 
rank is N+1. Therefore the inverse (𝑪𝑻 ∗ 𝑪)−1exists. All the 
algebraic operations of (4) are carried out in Zp. Then,   
mmi(C, p) can be expressed as,   
 
𝒎𝒎𝒊(𝑪, 𝑝) = 𝑪𝒍𝒆𝒇𝒕
−𝟏 = (𝑪𝑻 ∗ 𝑪)−1 ∗ 𝑪𝑻  (𝑖𝑛 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝)             (5)  
 The condition for the existence of the modular matrix inverse 
of (𝑪𝑻 ∗ 𝑪) is  𝑔𝑐𝑑(𝑑𝑒𝑡(𝑪𝑻 ∗ 𝑪), 𝑝) = 1.  since, p is chosen to 
be a prime, and this condition is automatically satisfied. From 
(2) and (3), 
 B*C = I (N+1) x (N+1) (mod  p)                                                  (6) 
Equation (6) can be rewritten as, 
mod (B*C, p) =  I (N+1) x (N+1) 
When there is no ambiguity, with matrix multiplication 
implemented in Zp, the above Equation can be simply written 
as, 
 B*C = I (N+1) x (N+1)                         (7) 
In (7), the rectangular matrix B is called the Moore–Penrose 
inverse of C. The Moore–Penrose inverse of matrix C is 
unique [26] for a given C and p. In our proposed scheme, 
 
‘generalized inverse’ of C is used instead of Moore–Penrose 
inverse. The generalized inverse is not unique and this 
property is utilized to randomize our encryption to prevent 
Chosen Plaintext Attack as will be described in section VII.B. 
E. Generalized Inverse of C 
The size of CT is (N+1) xM with (N+1) < M. It is a fat matrix. 
Therefore it has modular null space [27]. Let the modular null 
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space of matrix CT be denoted by the matrix F. Then, by the 
definition of modular null space, Matrix F in Zp satisfies,   
CT*F = 0(N+1) x L                           (8)  
F is obtained by using the standard function ModNull(CT, p). 
The size of F is MxL where, 
 L = M − (N+1)                          (9) 
The RHS of (8) is an all zero matrix of size (N+1)xL. Taking 
the transpose of (8), we have,    
 
 FT*C = 0L x (N+1)                                 (10)  
Now, consider the matrix R derived from the base matrix B 
and FT as, 
R = B+Y*FT                                                                        (11)   
Where, Y is an arbitrary matrix of size (N+1)xL in Zp. The size 
of FT is LxM. The size of the product Y*FT as well as R is 
(N+1) xM. In (11) addition and multiplication are carried out 
in Zp. Now the product R*C, from (11) will be, 
 
R*C = (B+Y*FT)*C = B*C + Y*FT*C                               (12)   
From (6), B*C = I and from (10), FT*C = 0. Therefore, from 
(12), 
R*C = I (N+1) x (N+1)                               (13) 
Equation (13) can be expressed in terms of the rows and 

























𝟏 𝟎 . . 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 𝟏 . . 𝟎 𝟎
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
𝟎 𝟎 . . 𝟏 𝟎







This can be expressed as, 
         𝑹𝒊 ∗ 𝑪𝒋 = {
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑖 = 𝑗
                                 (14)   
 
Since, matrix R satisfies (13), it is the generalized inverse of C. 
From (11), we see that matrix R depends on the arbitrary 
matrix Y. Therefore, R is not unique and it can take a large 
number of multiple values depending on the selected dissimilar 
values of Y. In this paper, these multiple distinct random R’s 
are designated as R{1}, R{2}… R{i}  and so on. Realization of 
multi-valued R{i}’s is possible due to the existence of the 
modular null space matrix F whose size is MxL. Therefore, for 
the existence of F, the value of L should be greater than 0. 
That is, from (9), M > (L+1) which means the number of rows 
of C should be greater than the number of columns of C. If C is 
a square matrix, this condition is not satisfied and we cannot 
have multi-valued R{i}’s.Let R{i} be the ith instance of R, 
Then, from (13), 
R{i}*C = I(N+1)x(N+1)                                                              (15)  
For i = 1, 2… so on. In general, when there is no ambiguity, 
we use the symbol R to represent any one version of R{i}’s. 
The multi-valued property of R is an essential requirement to 
prevent chosen plaintext attack as will be explained in section 
VII.B  
F. Key setup and Distribution 
Key Setup and Distribution is implemented by the Key 
Generation Center (KGC). A suitable, relatively large prime 
number p is selected as the modulus for Zp. Here, p is the 
security parameter. Higher the value of p, greater is the 
security. Since, modular arithmetic is used throughout all the 
operations, all operand values should be in the range 0 to p−1.  
Hence the selected p should be greater than the estimated 
maximum value, say dmax of the data set. Then dmax < p and all 
d’s belongs to Zp. Hence, the data sequence D gets aggregated 
correctly. 
G. Selection of Matrix C and Digital signature Parameter S 
After selecting p, the secret key matrix C of size (N+1)xM is 
generated randomly by KGC, such that the elements of C are 
in Zp. Parameter N is same as the number of sensors assigned 
to the CH. The extra row of C is used for signature verification 
as will be explained later. The value of M is chosen to be 
greater than (N+1). Here, M is taken as M = N+1+L where L is 
in the range 2 to 4. A higher value of L increases the size of the 
keys and cipher text which in turn increases the 
communication overhead. A smaller value of L decreases the 
security level. While selecting matrix C, it should be ensured 
that its modular inverse B exists. 
The digital signature parameter, represented by S is a scalar 
in Zp. In general, it is relatively a large number in Zp so that it 
is difficult to predict by a hacker.  
H. Calculation of B, F and R 
After selecting C, its modular matrix inverse B is calculated 
using the function B = mmi(C, p) as given by (2). Standard 
built functions based on Gauss Jordan row reduction 
method and extended Euclid’s algorithm are available [24], 
[28] to find B. The modular null space F of C is also calculated 
based on the row reduction method [29]. From B and F, R{i}’s 
are calculated as given by (11). 
I. Key Distribution 
The calculated values of R{i}’s along with the signature 
parameter S and the modulus value p are sent by the KGC to 
the CH through a secured channel. The CH encrypts and 
aggregates using these values. The KGC also sends C, S and p 
to the End User for decryption/de-aggregation. 
IV. PROPOSED SYSTEM MODEL 
The basic model of the Secure Data Aggregator and De-
aggregator is shown in Fig.2. In the layout shown in Fig. 2, the 
intermediate relay nodes (RNs), BS and the Cloud Server (CS) 
do not have access to R {i}’s, signature parameter S and p. 




Fig.2 Basic model of the Secure Data Aggregator and De-aggregator 
 
But the End User (EU), which is the de-aggregator, has access 
to these parameters. 
A.  Secured Loss less Data Aggregation with digital signature 
at CH 
On receiving all data values from the sensors (over one TDMA 
cycle), the CH formulates the data vector as, 
 D = [d1, d2… dN] 
The size of D is 1xN. Then, CH appends the signature 
parameter S to D to get the augmented data vector E as, 
E = [D, S] = [d1, d2… dN, S]                             (16)                                                                                 
Now, the size of E is 1x (N+1). The secure aggregate vector, 
designated by A is generated as, 
A = mod (E*R{i}, p)    can be rewritten as, 
 
A = E*R{i}                                                                       (17) 
Size of A is (1x (N+1)) x ((1+N) xM) = 1xM.  Here, matrix     
R{i} is an instance of multivalued matrix R. Row vector A is 
sent to CS through RNs and the BS. The EU receives 
aggregate A from the CS. Here, row vector A is the encrypted 
aggregate of data vector E. Therefore, from the encryption 
point of view, A is the cipher text and E is the plain text.  
B. Signature Verification and De-aggregation at EU 
On receiving the encrypted aggregate A, the EU verifies the 
signature and if successful, de-aggregates A. 
1) Signature Verification 
In SDA-MK, the signature parameter S is embedded in 
aggregate vector A and S is recovered from A as follows. 
At EU, consider the product W = A*C. From (17), substituting 
for A, we get,  
W=A*C=E*R {i}*C                                                              (18)  
Here, size of A is 1xM and size of C is M x (N+1). Therefore 
size of W is 1x (N+1). From (13), (18) and (16),         
W =E*R{i}*C = E*I=E = [d1, d2… dN, S]                            (19) 
From (18) and (19),  
 A*C = [d1, d2… dN, S]                                                          (20) 
Expressing C in terms of its columns, (20) can be expressed as,           
A*[C1, C2… CN, C (N+1)] = [d1, d2… dN, S]                            (21) 
From (21), A*C (N+1) = S. Therefore the calculated value of S 
recovered from A by EU is, 
Scal = A*C (N+1)                                                                       (22) 
The EU calculates Scal using (22) and verifies the signature by 
comparing Scal with S which has been already received from 
KGC. If Scal ≠ S, the signature verification fails. When the 
signature verification fails, the authenticity/integrity of the 
received aggregate A is lost. Therefore, received A is discarded 
without de-aggregation.If Scal = S, the signature verification is 
successful. The signature verification at EU provides source 
and data authenticity.  Then the EU de- aggregates the data as 
follows. 
2) De-aggregation/Decryption at EU  
From (21), taking the first N elements from RHS and LHS,    
we get,  
[d1, d2… dN]=A*[C1, C2… CN] = D                                       (23) 
Since, matrix C is available to EU, the EU de- 
aggregates/decrypts A to recover original data D using (23). 
C. Authentication and data integrity with signature 
The aggregator CH attaches the signature S which is known to 
CH and EU only. When there is no error or alteration in A, 
signature Scal should be same as the original S. On the other 
hand,  during aggregation and transmission, if A gets corrupted 
or altered (say by a malicious attacker or noise etc.), Scal   
would be different from S. Thus, our signature verification 
scheme is unforgeable. The example given below demonstrates 
Signature verification, De-aggregation and authentication 
process in WSN. 
Example1: p = 499; N = 4; M = 7; L=M−N−1=2. All 
operations are in Zp. Matrix C is generated randomly. From 
C, matrix R’s are obtained for different values of random 
matrix Y, two such samples of R’s are given below. 
 
















































































It can be verified that R{1}*C = I and R{2}*C = I. In this 
example, let R = R{1}. Data vector D is taken as, 
        D = [7    23    74    76]. Signature S is taken as, S = 27.  
Augmented data is E = [7    23    74    76    27] = [D, S] 
Encrypted Aggregate A = E*R is found to be, 
                   A = [148   348   316   468    67   449   386]. 
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Signature verification: The last column of C is CN+1 =         
[39    94    98    68    91    85    38] T.   Then, Scal = A*CN+1, 
found to be same as, S = 27.Then, the data vector D is 
recovered as D = A*[C1, C2… CN] = [7    23    74    76]. 
V. SECURED SUM AGGREGATION 
In this section security for the sum is achieved using SDA-MK 
approach. The sum aggregate provides the overall quantitative 
status of the sensed data values. Secured Sum Aggregation 
(SSA) generates the aggregate that represents the sum of data 
values. From the sum of data values average values can be 
easily determined.  Let the time slots at which sensor readings 
are taken be denoted by t1, t2,…,tK where t1< t2< … < tK.  Let 
us assume that the time slots are uniform. Total number of 
time slots taken is K. For brevity, time slot corresponding to tj 
be referred as time slot TS(j). Let the data value generated by 
sensor i at TS(j) be denoted by d(i, j). The data values of N 
sensors form data matrix D at time slots TS(j) for j = 1 to K, is 
augmented with signature parameter S for each j, to get the 
augmented matrix Q of size (N+1)xK  and the data matrix D is 
represented in yellow background as shown in Table I. U(j)’s 
& V(i)’s are columns and  rows of matrix Q respectively as in 
Table I.  
 
TABLE I 
AUGMENTED MATRIX Q OF SIZE (N+1) XK 
 
 
Here, column U(j), corresponding to time slot TS(j) is given 
by, 
U(j) = [d(1, j), d(2, j) ,…,d(i, j),….,d(N, j), S ]T                   (24) 
for j = 1 to K. Column vector U(j) gives the data values of all 
the N sensors at time slot TS(j) appended with S. Then matrix 
Q can be expressed as, 
 𝐐 = [𝑼(1), 𝑼(2), … , 𝑼(𝑗), … , 𝑼(𝑘)]                  (25) 
  
A.  Temporal Data Summation 
Consider the Sum of Columns of Q represented by SU. From 
(24), 
 SU = U(1) + U(2) +…+ U(j) +…+ U(K)                           (26)  

























































































∑ 𝑑(1, 𝑗) 𝐾𝑗=1
∑ 𝑑(2, 𝑗) 𝐾𝑗=1
.
∑ 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) 𝐾𝑗=1
.
∑ 𝑑(𝑁, 𝑗) 𝐾𝑗=1







                                                            (27) 
The term ∑ 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)  𝐾𝑗=1   represents the sum of the elements of 
row V(𝑖) of matrix 𝑄.  Summation ∑ 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) 𝐾𝑗=1 is the temporal 
sum of data of  sensor i. Let us represent the temporal sum by 
sv(i) as,                                                  
𝑠𝑣(𝑖) = ∑𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) 
𝐾
𝑗=1
                                                                      (28) 
Then, from (27) and (28),                              
 𝑆𝑼 = [𝑠𝑣(1), 𝑠𝑣(2) … 𝑠𝑣(𝑖). , 𝑠𝑣(𝑁), 𝑠𝑣(𝑁 + 1 )]𝑇           (29) 
Here, sv (N+1) is the sum of the (N+1)th row of Q, which is 
equal to K*S. From (29) and (26), 
 𝑺𝑼 =  [𝑠𝑣(1), 𝑠𝑣(2) … , 𝑠𝑣(𝑖) … , 𝑠𝑣(𝑁), 𝑠𝑣(𝑁 + 1)]𝑇 = 
                        𝑈(1) + 𝑈(2) + ⋯+ 𝑈(𝑗) + ⋯+ 𝑈(𝐾)          (30) 
SU is a column vector of size (N+1) x 1. The ith element of 
SU, represented by sv (i) gives the temporal sum of the data 
values of sensor i, for i = 1 to N. The value of sv (N+1) = K *S, 
where S is signature parameter as in Table I. 
B. Secured Sum Aggregation to get temporal sum 
Consider the summation represented by ATU i.e, Aggregate of 
Total of U’s as, 
 
ATU=U(1)T*R{1}+U(2)T*R{2}+...+U(j)T*R{j}+....+U(K)T 
*R{K}                                                                                   (31) 
 
Here, the size of U (j) T is 1x (N+1) and that of R {j} is  
(N+1)xM. The size of ATU is 1xM. In (31), matrix R {j} is the 
jth generalized inverse of C. Therefore, for j = 1 to K, 
 
R{j}*C= I (N+1) x (N+1)                                                             (32) 
 
  
     TS(j)s 
Sensors 
 
TS(1) TS(2) … TS(j) … TS(k) 
  U(1) U(2) … U(j) … U(K) 
Sensor 1   V(1) d(1,1) d(1,2) … d(1 j) … d(1, K) 
Sensor 2 V(2) d(2,1) d(2,2) … d(2,j) … d(2, K) 
…. … … … … …  … 
Sensor i V(i) d(i, 1) d(i, 2) … d(i, j) … d(i, K) 
… … … … … … … … 
Sensor N V(N) d(N,1) d(N,2) … d(N j) … d(N, K) 
Signature V(N+1) S S … S … S 
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Temporal sum block diagram is shown in Fig. 3.The CH 
executes the summation given by (31) to encrypt as well as to 
aggregate U (i)’s. At the CH, the sensor data vectors U (1) 
arrives at TS (1), U(2)  arrives  at TS(2),…, U(K) arrives at 
TS(K). Therefore, the time interval between adjacent time slots 
is the delay between the arrivals of the consecutive U (j)’s. 
Hence the CH can do summation cumulatively one term at a 
time as, 
ATU = 0; 
for i = 1 to K   
ATU = ATU+U(i)T *R{i}; //all operations  
                         are in Zp  
End of for 
C.  Decryption at End User 
Decryption of ATU is carried out at EU to get the decrypted 
output DTU (De-aggregate of Total of U’s) as,      
DTU =ATU*C                                                                      (33) 
Correctness of decryption: From (31) and (33),           
                                          
 DTU=(U(1)T*R{1}+U(2)T*R{2}+..+U (j) T*R {j} +...+       
U (K) T *R {K})*C 
= U(1)T *R{1}*C+ U(2)T *R{2}*C+…+ U(j)T *R{j}*C+…+ 
U(K)T *R{K}*C 
From (32), R{j}*C = I for all j’s, we have, 
DTU = U(1) T + U(2) T +…+ U(j) T +…+ U(K) T =  
[U(1) +U(2) +…+ U(j) +…+ U(K)]T                                   (34) 
 
The size of row vector DTU is 1x (N+1). From (34) and (30),  
(DTU)T= U(1) + U(2) +…+ U(j) +…+ U(K) = SU 
=[𝑠𝑣(1), 𝑠𝑣(2)… , 𝑠𝑣(𝑖) … , 𝑠𝑣(𝑁), 𝑠𝑣(𝑁 + 1)]𝑇             (35) 
From (35), 
DTU = [𝑠𝑣(1), 𝑠𝑣(2) … , 𝑠𝑣(𝑖) … , 𝑠𝑣(𝑁), 𝑠𝑣(𝑁 + 1)]     (36)   
  
The ith element, DTU (i) gives sv(i) for i = 1 to N. That is the 
row vector DTU(1: N) gives the temporal sum of N sensors. In 
other words,    
DTU(1: N) = Temporal_sum_N                                           (37) 
The last element DTU (N+1) gives the sum of K number of 
signature parameter S (refer Table I) which is equal to K*S.  
 
That is, DTU (N+1) = sv(N+1) = K*S                                 (38) 
    
Fig.3 Secure data aggregation to get the temporal sum 
D. Signature verification 
Considering equation (33),    DTU =ATU*C, Where the size 
of DTU is 1x (N+1).  
Secrete key Matrix C can be expressed in terms of its sub 
matrices as  
C = [G, H]                                   (39) 
 
Where G = [C1, C2…., CN] i.e., first N columns of C,  and 
H = CN+1 i.e., last column of C. 
From (33) and (39),   
 
DTU =ATU*[G, H] = [ATU*G, ATU*H]                          (40)    
Here, the size of G is MxN and that of H is Mx1. In (40), the 
size of ATU*G is (1xM)x(MxN) = 1xN. The size of ATU*H is 
(1xM) x (Mx1) = 1x1. Therefore, the first N elements of row 
vector DTU is given by, 
 
DTU (1: N) = ATU*G                                                          (41)   
From (41) and (37),         
Temporal_sum_N = ATU*G                                                (42)   
The last element DTU is, 
DTU (N+1) = ATU*H                                                          (43)   
From (43) and (38), we see that 
ATU*H = K*S                                                                      (44) 
Here, signature verification is done by checking that  
DTU (N+1) = K*S. 
E.  Verification and Decryption algorithm at End user 
The inputs and output of the algorithms are:  
Input: ATU, Secret key Components G and H as derived from 
C. [as in Eqn. (39)].  
Output: Signature Verification and Temporal_sum_N 
 
Algorithm 1: 
   Receive ATU; 
 Get ATU*H 
 If ATU*H ≠ K*S //Signaure is incorrect   
 Diplay “Signature Verification Failed”  
 Discard ATU 
 Request for re-transmission 
 Exit 
 Else  
 Display “Signature Verification Success” 
 Get sum of temporal data for N sensors 
 as, 
 Temporal_Sum_N = ATU*G    //sum ready 
 Exit                                       
 endif 
F. Constraints on Secured sum Aggregation 
In all calculations of SSA aggregation and decryption, we use 
modular arithmetic. Therefore the result of decryption, DTU is 
in Zp. From (36),  
 
DTU(i) = sv(i) mod p   , for i = 1 to N+1               (45) 
 
If the exact sum sv(i) as given by (28) is less than p, then from 
(45) we see that  DTU(i) = 𝑠𝑣(𝑖). On the other hand if  
sv(i) ≥ p, then DTU(i) does not give the exact sum sv(i) 
because of mod operation. Hence, for the satisfactory 
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application of SSA, sv (i)’s should be less than p for i = 1 to 
N+1. That is 
sv (i) < p, for i = 1 to N+1                                    (46) 
 
By choosing a large p, equation (46) will be satisfied. The 
Aggregation and de-aggregation of temporal sums is 
demonstrated in example 2.  
 
Example 2: The data from 4 sensors, N = 4 for time slots,  
K = 3, along with Signature parameter S = 27 is shown in 
Table II.  Matrix C, value of p, matrices R {1} and R {2} are 
same as in Example 1.  Since the number of columns K of D is 
3, we need R {3} which satisfies equation (15).Data matrix D 
is shown with yellow background. 
 
TABLE II 
AUGMENTED DATA MATRIX Q 
         TS(j)s  
sensors 
 TS(1) TS(2) TS(3) Sum 
  U(1) U(2) U(3) SU 
Sensor 1 V(1) 7 70 34 111 
Sensor 2 V(2) 23 62 85 170 
Sensor 3 V(3) 74 90 4 168 
Sensor 4 V(4) 76 76 60 212 
Signature S 27 27 27 81 
 


























Aggregated Row Total ATU is obtained using (31) as,   
ATU = [308   342   165   291    84   166   486]       
From equation (44), ATU*H is found to be, ATU*H = 81 
which is same as K*S = 3*27. Therefore, the signature is 
correct. 
Temporal_sum_N from equation (42) is found as        ATU*G 
= [111   170   168   212] which is found equal to the temporal 
sum of 4 sensors as shown in Table II.  
 
De-aggregation with tampered data:  Let the attacker change 
ATU (1) to 309 as,  
ATU_tamp = [309   342   165   291    84   166   486]. Then,  
ATU_tamp*H is found equal to 120 which is unequal to the 
expected K*S which is 81. Here, the signature verification has 
failed. This inequality points out the loss of data integrity.      
G. Spatial Data Summation 
Consider the data matrix D, shaded yellow in Table I. Each 
column of D gives the data values of all the N sensors at that 
time slot. Therefore the sum of the elements each column  
 
(column sum) of D gives the spatial sum at the corresponding 
time slot. Since the column sums of matrix D are same as the 
row sums of DT, the methods of section V.A can be used to 
find the spatial sums at successive time slots using matrix DT 
instead of D. 
VI. AGGREGATION OF SUM BY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION 
The aggregate summation described in section V can be 
interpreted in terms of homomorphic addition as follows. 
Consider the encryption operation described by (31)  
ATU=U(1)T*R{1}+U(2)T*R{2}+...+U(j)T*R{j}+....+U(K)T *R{K}     
Let us introduce the symbol ATU (j) to represent the product 
term U(j) T *R{j} for j = 1 to K as, 
 ATU(j) = U(j) T *R{j}                                                          (47) 
 
The size of U(j)T is 1x (N+1) and that of R{i} is (N+1)xM. 
The size of ATU(j) is 1xM. Here, ATU(j) is the encryption of 
the augmented data vector U(j) T in time slot TS(i) {refer Table 
I}.  
A. Homomorphic addition at cloud Server 
In the Homomorphic addition scheme, the CH encrypts   U(j) T 
according to (47) and transmits ATU(j) for j = 1 to K the 
Cloud Server (CS). The basic layout is shown in Fig. 4. The 
CH encrypts each U(j)T to get ATU(j) as given by (47) and 
forwards it to the CS. 
 
 
Fig.4. Homomorphic Addition in CS 
B. Signature Verification at CS 
The CS on receiving vector ATU (j)’s, checks for signature 
verification by calculating Scal as, 
Scal = ATU (j)*H                                     (48)  
where H is the last column of C i.e H = C N+1. In (48), the size 
of vector ATU (j) is 1xM and that of H is Mx1. Equation. (48) 
is similar to (44). Verification is similar to as described in 
section V.D. Therefore, the decoding vector H and the 
signature parameter S are made available to CS at the start of 
the session. On successful verification, the CS adds the 
individual   ATU (j)’s to get the sum ATU as, 
  𝐴𝑇𝑈 = ∑ 𝐴𝑇𝑈(𝑗)𝐾𝑗=1                                                           (49)  
The EU on accessing ATU decrypts it to get DTU as described 
in signature verification and decryption algorithm under 
section V. Here, the CS acts as the homomorphic adder.          
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VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SDA-MK 
A. Cipher text Expansion Ratio 
Cipher text Expansion Ratio (CER) expresses how many times 
bigger the size of the cipher text is compared to that of its 
plaintext. CER is the ratio of the cipher text size to its plaintext 
size. A higher value of CER means the computational cost and 
communication overheads are higher. Smaller the CER better 
is the encryption efficiency. CER is defined as, 
𝐶𝐸𝑅 =
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑖𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡
                                                        (50) 
In our SDA-MK approach, from (17), the size of the cipher 









                                                                    (51) 
In SDA-MK, in the light of (9), the cipher text length             
M = N+L+1. Therefore, the cipher text length varies linearly 
with N.  
B. Protection against chosen Plaintext Attack 
In Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA), the attacker can chose his 
plaintexts arbitrarily and get the corresponding cipher texts and 
based on these observations, the attacker tries to access the 
secret key(s) of the encrypter. In SDA-MK, the encryption is 
randomized as it uses different random secret keys, R{i}’s for 
successive encryptions. Therefore, SDA-MK is immune to 
CPA. 
C. Protection against chosen Cipher text Attack 
Chosen Cipher text Attack (CCA) tries to break the security of 
the decrypter (in this case, the de-aggregator). The attacker can 
chose different arbitrary cipher texts and can access the 
corresponding decrypted plaintexts. Using these values, the 
attacker tries to crack the decryption key(s). In SDA-MK, the 
digital signature scheme provides protection against CCA. 
Here, each cipher text input to the decrypter is evaluated (50) 
for valid signature S. If the signature check fails, there is no 
plaintext output. Hence the CCA attacker is unable crack the 
decrypter as most of the plaintext responses are empty.  
VIII. COMPARISON  OF  SDA-MK WITH OTHER METHODS 
A. Signature Verification Efficiency of SDA-MK 
In SDA-MK, a single signature (scalar S) provides verification 
for N data values collected from the sensors (16).Therefore 
SDA-MK is highly efficient compared to those schemes where 
data vector of length N requires a signature vector of length 
substantially greater than 1. Theoretical efficiency of 
SDA_MK is compared with Lyubashevsky Micciancio 
Signature (LMS) method [30] and Gupta and Biswas 
(GUPTA) [31]. In LMS method, the size of the generator 
matrix is SGx(SG+1). The maximum data value can be (p−1). 
Therefore the number of bits required to represent a data value 
is ceil (Log2 (p−1)) which is approximately ceil (Log2 (p)). 
Theparameters taken for comparison are the computational 
costs of signature verification as well as the lengths of 
messages and signatures. The comparison values are shown in 
Table III. Here, N is the number of sensors, M = N+L+1 (9). 
(For large values of N, the value of M is approximately equal 
to N). The cost of one scalar multiplication in Zp is [Log2 (p)] 2 
bit operations. 
TABLE III 






































Log2(p) + 1] 
     SG = Number of rows of the generator matrix in LMS.  
 
From Table III, it can be seen that SDA-MK is theoretically 
more efficient in signature verification compared to LMS 
method but almost equal to GUPTA method.  
B. Experimental Results 
Simulation is carried out in Matlab to determine the execution 
times for signature verification in SDA-MK, LMS,GUPTA 
methods.For LMS method the generator matrix size parameter 
SG is selected as 10. Finite Field modulus is set at p = 499. 
The number of data elements is varied from N =100 to 500 in 
steps of 50. The Execution times of the three methods are 
shown in Table IV. Here, T1, T2 and T3 are execution times in 
micro-seconds.  
  TABLE IV 















N T1 T2 T3 S2 S3 
100 17.1 35.2 66.6 51.4 74.3 
150 19.5 36.5 60.7 46.6 67.9 
200 21.6 40.9 62.4 47.2 65.4 
250 25.1 44.4 61.7 43.5 59.3 
300 28.1 46.9 64.8 40.1 56.6 
350 30.2 51.2 70.2 41.0 57.0 
400 35.1 55.7 73.4 37.0 52.2 
450 37.6 58.7 82.6 35.9 54.5 
500 39.3 61.6 78.1 36.2 49.7 
 
Percentage savings in execution times w.r.t LMS and GUPTA 
method are respectively given by. 
S2 = 100*(T2‒T1)/T2  , S3 = 100*(T3‒T1)/T3 
S2 and S3 values are shown in the last two columns of Table 
IV. The timing values of Table IV are plotted in Fig. 5. 
From the Fig.5, it can be seen that SDA-MK takes lower 
execution time for signature verification. (The execution times 
are machine dependent and the result shown in Fig. 5 is useful 
for the purpose of comparison only). The zig-zag natures of the 
plots is due to the modular algebraic operations of the 
corresponding algorithms. 
INTEGER MATRIX KEYS FOR SECURE DATA AGGREGATION IN CLUSTERED WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 645 
 
 
Fig.5.Execution Time versus Number of Sensor Nodes 
IX. CONCLUSION 
A new method of Loss-less Secure Data Aggregation using 
Matrix Keys is described. A speciality of this method is, the 
generation of multiple distinct random orthogonal matrices to 
prevent chosen plain text attack. The novelty of this method is 
to achieve data privacy and data integrity simultaneously by 
embedding the digital signature in the aggregated data. The 
implementation of a new technique on sum aggregation is 
another major contribution of this research work. The 
encryption/decryption process has low 
computational/communication overhead. The digital signature 
also provides source authentication with unforgeability. The 
encryption process is inherently homomorphic for addition and 
SDA-MK is extended to aggregate the sum of sensor data 
values both temporally and spatially. 
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